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THE TINDERBOX CITY: 
THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF FIRE 





Hankow was notorious throughout China as a tinderbox. Indeed, to many its name 
was synonymous with fire.
William Rowe1
It may even be said that the injury done to China by Kerosene is more grave than that 
done by opium, for although opium is indeed a poison, its action is slow, whereas 
with Kerosene, which is found everywhere, if it once catches fire, it spreads the more 
you try to put it out.
Zhang Zhidong2
Introduction
One winter evening in 1849 the Yangzi River caught fire. The conflagration broke 
out on a sampan moored between Hankou, Wuchang and Hanyang, the three sister 
cities known today as Wuhan.3 Here, the harbours were so crowded that observers 
often described how a ‘forest of masts’ seemed to stretch out to the horizon.4 This 
forest was now ablaze. The poet Ye Diaoyuan immortalised the disastrous scenes, 
describing a cacophony of gongs beaten to warn of the oncoming inferno, ash 
floating into the air, and water turning red in the flickering light of the flames. 
The fire consumed all vessels in its path, from humble cargo sampans to ornate flower 
boats (huachuan)—a euphemism for floating brothels. Those aboard were trapped 
‘like fish swimming in a cauldron’, yet if they jumped into the river they faced the 
very probable risk of drowning. So many chose this latter option that Ye remarked 
1  William T. Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796–1895 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1989), 158.
2  North China Herald, 24 February 1888, 211.
3  I follow Rowe by focusing mostly on Hankou—or Hankow as he wrote it at the time—but we will occasionally 
follow fires across the rivers to Wuchang and Hanyang.
4  For example, Gretchen Mae Fitkin, The Great River: The Story of a Voyage on the Yangtze Kiang (Shanghai, 
North-China Daily News, 1922), 61.
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ruefully that although the ‘fire god’ (huoshen) had committed the evil act, it was the 
‘water god’ (shuishen) who derived the benefits. Before long the merchant guilds 
that owned many of the burning boats sent for their private fire brigades, who 
dragged a number of hand-drawn fire engines to the riverside. The conflagration 
was now raging with such intensity that they could do little more than wait until it 
had burnt itself out. The economic elite of one of the greatest commercial cities in 
the Qing Empire stood back and watched half a million tons of precious cargo go 
up in smoke.5
Conflagrations such as this were not unusual in nineteenth-century Hankou. In his 
masterful two-volume study of the city during this period, William Rowe described 
how cramped neighbourhoods built from flammable materials suffered frequent 
fire disasters.6 Being one of the first historians to look beyond the European or 
American context, Rowe’s pioneering analysis gained significant influence in the 
historiography of fire. Extrapolating from his observations, Lionel Frost drew on 
game theory to suggest that the citizens of Hankou were locked in the prisoners’ 
dilemma—individuals defected from the collective responsibility to build a fireproof 
community, as they calculated that it was more financially expedient to replace 
individual buildings lost to flames. This collective deficit was exacerbated by the 
government, which failed to promote the necessary civic responsibility to tackle 
the problem.7 Frost’s analysis expanded upon earlier research conducted with Eric 
Jones, which had suggested that nineteenth-century cities in the United States and 
Europe had become substantially less fire-prone due to increases in lot sizes 
and the development of fire-retardant architecture—a process sometimes described 
as brickification. Meanwhile, the cities of ‘Asia and the Islamic World’ remained 
cramped and flammable, and thus prone to devastating conflagrations.8 This vision 
of global urban history was, as Cornel Zwierlein has observed, ‘untroubled by 
postcolonial reflections’.9 Instead, it posited a universalist trajectory towards urban 
modernity—a kind of stage theory of hazard reduction, in which European and 
American standards became the global aspirational ideal, and the non-West was 
trapped in an earlier epoch of fire.
5  Ye Diaoyuan, Hankou zhuzhici jiaozhu, ed. Xu Mingting and Ma Changsong (Wuhan: Hubei renmin 
chubanshe, 1985), 190–6.
6  William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796–1889 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1984); Rowe, Hankow: Conflict. Fires had been a major problem since the city was founded in 
the Ming Dynasty: see Yan Changhong, ‘Dahuo shao bujin, jie hou you fuxing—Ming Qing shidai Hankou da 
huozai’, in Wuhan zhanggu, ed. Xiao Zhihua and Yan Changhong (Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1994).
7  Lionel Frost, ‘Coping in Their Own Way: Asian Cities and the Problem of Fires’, Urban History 24, no. 1 
(1997): 5–16, doi.org/10.1017/S0963926800012141.
8  Lionel Frost and Eric Jones, ‘The Fire Gap and the Greater Durability of Nineteenth Century Cities’, Planning 
Perspectives 4, no. 3 (1989): 333–47, doi.org/10.1080/02665438908725687.
9  Cornel Zwierlein, ‘The Burning of a Modern City? Istanbul as Perceived by the Agents of the Sun Fire Office, 
1865–1870’, in Flammable Cities: Urban Conflagration and the Making of the Modern World, ed. Greg Bankoff, Uwe 
Lübken and Jordan Sand (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 82–102.
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The temporal framework that underpins this theory—in which fire serves as an 
index to gauge societal advancement—draws upon assumptions dating back at least 
to the nineteenth century. Cathy Frierson has described how fire was perceived 
as ‘stigmata of backwardness’ for late imperial Russia, which seemed locked in 
a form of rural stagnation that Western Europe had consigned to history.10 The 
representation of fire as a developmental deficit assumed particular potency within 
colonial and treaty-port cities, where radically different urban forms butted against 
one another. Since the eighteenth century, foreign merchants in Canton had seen 
the fires that ravaged the adjoining Chinese city as a pathological feature of the local 
culture—ignited by a ‘fatalistic’ population with little regard for safety and a passion 
for fireworks.11 Later such assumptions were codified into European insurance 
practices, with foreign companies refusing to issue policies for native buildings in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai.12 Ironically, as Zwierlein has observed, fire-loss ratios 
in these cities were actually lower than those found in Europe and America. Similar 
prejudice surrounded the issuing of fire insurance in Istanbul, despite the fact that 
Muslim and European buildings actually burned in similar proportions.13 In other 
instances, a clash of architectural styles that seemed to demonstrate the superior 
safety of Western styles actually represented contending adaptations to differing 
risks. Greg Bankoff has described how Spanish colonists in Manila built stone 
houses that offered excellent protection from fire, yet during earthquakes risked 
crushing their occupants to death. Meanwhile their indigenous counterparts lived 
in fire-prone bamboo and palm huts, which would inflict relatively little damage 
during earthquakes.14
Such examples demonstrate that the temporality of fire disasters is far more complex 
than is often assumed. They suggest that Asian cities were not necessarily behind 
Europe and America in an inexorable march towards urban rationalisation, and 
reveal, instead, that varying patterns of urban development generated varying risks. 
This more nuanced picture is reinforced when we realise that, although there may 
have been a statistical decline in the incidence of urban fire in the West during the 
nineteenth century, the conflagrations that did occur often reached startling new 
magnitudes. This was due to a process we might describe as the industrialisation 
10  Cathy A. Frierson, All Russia Is Burning! A Cultural History of Fire and Arson in Late Imperial Russia (Seattle, 
WA: University of Washington Press, 2002).
11  John M. Carroll, ‘Slow Burn in China: Factories, Fear, and Fire in Canton’, in Empires of Panic: Epidemics and 
Colonial Anxieties, ed. Robert Peckham (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), 35–56, doi.org/10.5790/
hongkong/9789888208449.003.0002.
12  Cornel Zwierlein, ‘Perceiving Urban Fire Regimes in Europe and China (1830 to 1870): British Fire Insurance 
Businesses and the Sudden Challenge of Globalisation’, in Historical Disaster Experiences: Transcultural Research, 
ed. Gerrit Jasper Schenk (Heidelberg: Springer, 2017), 327–54, doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49163-9_16.
13  ibid.
14  Greg Bankoff, ‘A Tale of Two Cities: The Pyro-Seismic Morphology of Nineteenth-Century Manila’, 
in Flammable Cities, ed. Bankoff, Lübken and Sand, 170–89.
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of fire disasters.15 As inexperienced city dwellers found themselves awash with 
volatile chemicals and unfamiliar technologies were woven into the fabric of older 
neighbourhoods, a tremendous number of novel fire hazards were unleashed. 
Stephen Pyne was certainly not wrong when he described how industrialisation 
would eventually help to reduce urban conflagrations, creating cities in which fire 
was almost entirely ‘embedded in machines or dispersed to power plants [and] 
absorbed into electrical or gas appliances that eliminated the need for open flame’.16 
Yet, before this advanced domestication could be achieved, industrialising cities first 
had to pass through what Scott Knowles has described as a ‘conflagration era’, in 
which their neighbourhoods burned ‘with a ferocity that challenged the notion of 
modernity itself as a sustainable urban condition’.17 In this temporal framework, 
frequent fires were not so much an embarrassing sign of urban immaturity, more an 
awkward phase experienced by cities progressing to a new material form.
This article describes what happened as Hankou entered its own conflagration era. 
During the early twentieth century, the cramped alleyways of the city centre gave 
way to spacious boulevards, meaning that before long it was quite unrecognisable 
from the wooden metropolis described by Rowe. Despite these changes, Hankou 
continued to suffer regular catastrophic fires. At first it might appear that this was 
a problem of local governance, with politicians failing to drag their citizens into 
a modern world of rational planning. This article presents an alternative explanation, 
arguing that local attempts at reform struggled to keep pace with a continuously 
evolving hazard. In this respect, the situation in Hankou closely resembled that 
described by Christine Meisner Rosen in Chicago, Boston and Baltimore; cities 
that continued to suffer the scourge of fire because ‘adaptations lagged significantly 
behind the need for adaption’.18 Yet Hankou faced considerably greater political and 
economic setbacks than these American counterparts, as its period of modernisation 
was accompanied by frequent wars and revolutions that caused near-complete 
societal collapse. Meanwhile, increased integration into global markets exposed 
Hankou to an array of new incendiary products. Wooden alleyways were doused 
with kerosene and petroleum, while their inhabitants struck friction matches to 
light machine-rolled cigarettes.
The story of fire in modern Hankou is not one that can be understood by dissecting 
parochial foibles of town planning—it was part of a broader global narrative. Whilst 
conflagrations thrived in cramped wooden neighbourhoods, they were sparked by 
phosphorus dug from distant mines and fuelled by oil shipped across the ocean. 
15  Definitions of industrialisation vary, but for fire history its meaning is ‘crystal clear: it refers to the burning 
of fossil biomass’. Stephen J. Pyne, Fire: A Brief History (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 155.
16  ibid., 111.
17  Scott Gabriel Knowles, The Disaster Experts: Mastering Risk in Modern America (Philadelphia, PA: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 21.
18  Christine Meisner Rosen, The Limits of Power: Great Fires and the Process of City Growth in America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 5, doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511471056.
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Ironically, the profits from such incendiary products would help to lay the economic 
foundations for the fireproof cities of Europe and America. This dynamic was 
replicated in microcosm in Hankou, where matchstick merchants and kerosene 
barons helped to improve fire safety by modernising the city, even as the products 
they peddled were causing horrific conflagrations. By examining the turbulent 
history of one fire-prone city, this article aims a broader critique at the tendency 
to treat places like Hankou as laggards on the march to rationalisation. It is not 
sufficient to castigate particular patterns of urban morphology for turning cities into 
kindling without also asking how global markets ignited and accelerated the flames. 
True, the fires that struck Hankou were local problems caused by overcrowding and 
flammable architecture. Yet the flames were also fuelled by interactions with novel 
commodities, markets and weapons. Stated simply, Hankou did not burn because it 
was failing to be modern—modernisation burned Hankou.
A city of fire and water
Fire and water have been two of nature’s greatest urban planners. Each in its own 
way has helped to forge the contours of cities, punishing those that ignored basic 
environmental constraints with conflagrations or inundations. While many urban 
populations have had to contend with one these hazards in their histories, few have 
suffered both with such regularity as those living in Hankou. Though both problems 
may seem to stem from a common problem of poor municipal governance, in 
reality the dialectical relationship between fire and water was considerably more 
complicated. Counter-intuitive as it may seem, an abundance of water actually 
made Hankou more fire-prone. As a thin strip of land bordered by rivers and 
wetlands on all sides, the city was unable to sprawl and consequently became 
one of the most densely populated areas in the Qing Empire.19 Local building 
techniques compounded the problem of overcrowding, as the houses of Hankou 
were constructed mostly from timber, bamboo and reed. Rowe explains that this 
architectural choice was the result of the city’s thriving timber market, yet Frost 
speculates that it may also have represented the triumph of individuated cost-
cutting over considerations of collective well-being.20 A further explanation is that 
these styles represented a rational response to the problem of flooding—timber and 
bamboo could be replaced with relative ease if damaged by water, while reed huts 
(maowu or maopeng) could be relocated to high ground when rivers rose. Like those 
living in earthquake-prone Manila, the residents of Hankou were forced to contend 
with a hierarchy of hazards; by ameliorating the dominant threat of flooding they 
generated a secondary risk of fire.
19  Rowe, Hankow: Commerce.
20  Rowe, Hankow: Conflict, 159; Frost, ‘Coping in Their Own Way’.
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The relationship between fire and water was locked into the annual rhythm of 
advancing and retreating rivers. Although summer posed a number of fire hazards, 
including lightning, it was winter that was the season of fire, being relatively dry and 
windy, meaning sparks would be whipped up into flames.21 Winter also marked the 
lull in the agricultural year, when tens of thousands of rural migrants would travel 
to Hankou looking for casual work. Such economic nomads built huts from wild-
land grasses and urban detritus, filling in the gaps in the urban landscape to create 
an unbroken chain of combustible material.22 Meanwhile, shrinking rivers left 
waterways so clogged with wooden vessels that they ceased to function as firebreaks 
and instead became conduits for flame. Conflagrations spreading from boat to boat 
or sparks drifting on the wind allowed fire to jump the rivers, spreading across the 
not inconsiderable distance between the three Wuhan cities.23 The season of fire 
finally began to abate with the coming of the spring rains. Yet, rather than heralding 
a period of stability, the precipitation presaged the coming of the summer floods. 
Thus, disasters had a distinct temporality, alternating between two seasons of risk.
Hankou residents were not passive in the face of fire. Rowe detailed the considerable 
efforts expended by the local elite during the course of the nineteenth century 
to stop the city burning. Unfortunately, the bright light of reform soon lost its 
lustre, as zoning practices and building codes were ignored and fire lanes became 
congested.24 Frost was certainly correct to assert that an absence of governmental 
action exacerbated these problems. This was less a general problem than a specific 
issue arising in the mid-nineteenth century. It is worth recalling that during this 
era the Qing Empire was beset by an array of domestic and international pressures. 
In this context, it is amazing that any form of fire prevention evolved. Yet evolve 
it did, the clearest example being guild-sponsored fire brigades, which replaced the 
military-run brigades of the eighteenth century. Private firefighting was not unusual 
at this time. It could be found in such diverse corners of the early modern world as 
the bustling Japanese city of Edo and the logging camps of the American West.25 
The lithograph reproduced as Figure 1 gives some sense of how private brigades 
operated in the Wuhan cities. It depicts a conflagration in 1884, which destroyed the 
Yellow Crane Tower (Huanghe Lou) in Wuchang. Though no doubt embellished by 
artistic imagination, the key aspects of this image are consistent with contemporary 
descriptions of fires.
21  See for example ‘Xiakou feizai’, Shenbao, 15 February 1894; ‘Ku zai Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 9 September 
1910; North China Herald, 10 October 1898, 665; Yan, ‘Dahuo shao bujin’. Fire has a similar seasonality in Edo: 
see Jordan Sand and Steven Wills, ‘Governance, Arson, and Firefighting in Edo, 1600–1868’, in Flammable Cities, 
ed. Bankoff, Lübken and Sand, 44–62.
22  Rowe, Hankow: Conflict, 159.
23  ibid. See description of the 1849 fire above. There is also a report of fire jumping the river in The Straits Times, 
23 September 1887.
24  Rowe, Hankow: Conflict, 158–68.
25  Sand and Wills, ‘Governance, Arson, and Firefighting’; Gregory Simon, Flame and Fortune in the American 
West: Urban Development, Environmental Change, and the Great Oakland Hills Fire (Oakland, CA: University 
of California Press, 2017), doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520292802.001.0001.
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Figure 1: An Ancient Monument in Deathly Clouds (Guji Yunwang), Wu Youru, 
Dianshizhai Huabao.
Source: Image courtesy of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich.26
We can gain a clear sense of the firefighting techniques and technologies available 
in the 1880s. In the bottom right, a figure beats a gong, which was in part a siren, 
announcing the passage of a fire engine, and in part an alarm system for the local 
population, evoking a similar note of panic to the clanging of European church 
bells.27 The centre is dominated by several fire brigades, each competing to tackle 
the blaze. Firefighters throughout the world have tended to employ two methods—
using demolition to create firebreaks and water to douse flames.28 Early Qing 
firefighters used both strategies, employing fire hooks to pull down houses and 
26  Dianshizhai Huabao, ji ji, yi (Shanghai, 1884–89) 6: 43. L.sin K 175 1/10. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 
Munich, daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/bsb00075644/image_154, accessed 1 June 2018. Dianshizhai Huabao was 
a popular Shanghai pictorial. For a discussion of this particular image see also Li Qingnan, ‘Jiushi Wuhan huozai 
yu minjian zijiu’, Wuhan wenshi ziliao 2 (2015).
27  See, for example, ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 22 January 1891; ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 24 September 
1895.
28  Adrian Tinniswood, By Permission of Heaven: The Story of the Great Fire of London (New York: Riverhead 
Books, 2004).
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throwing water from buckets. In the late eighteenth century, firefighters began to 
employ hand-drawn fire engines known as ‘water dragons’ (shuilong), which were 
large tanks on wheels from which jets of water were shot using hand-operated piston 
pumps. Later, many fire brigades began importing lighter American models, which 
perhaps explains why one of the engines depicted in Figure 1 has a banner reading 
‘foreign dragon’ (yanglong). Though a valuable addition to the firefighting arsenal, 
fire dragons were poorly suited to the narrow alleyways of Hankou, especially when 
numerous private brigades were vying to be first on the scene of the fire.29
Figure 1 also gives us a sense of the institutional approach to fire in the 1880s. 
On the left we can see that, in addition to firefighters, a number of soldiers have 
been posted brandishing spears, no doubt as a precautionary measure against 
looting, while on the right we see a group of notables sporting distinctive hats. The 
centre of the lithograph is dominated by firefighting crews, each with a prominent 
banner revealing their name and institutional affiliation. We can see, for example, 
that the Praying for Peace (Qiu Xi) brigade was sent from the God of Literature 
Pavilion (Wenchang Ge), while the Great King Temple (Dawang Miao) had sent the 
Peaceful Water Dragon (Ping’an Shuilong).30 Such banners, and the accompanying 
characters that adorned the clothing of brigade members, helped firefighters to 
identify their institution amidst the confused scenes of a disaster. The missionary 
W. Arthur Cornaby, who witnessed similar scenes in Hanyang two decades later, 
suggested that these banners had a religious as well as a practical function. They 
were designed to ‘label the merit’ of the particular benevolent institution that had 
sponsored the brigade, to ensure that the good deed of extinguishing a fire was 
not ‘reckoned to the wrong account in the world of the unseen’.31 Though the text 
accompanying Figure 1 is silent on this particular religious issue, it does describe 
how locals trawling through the ashes of the Yellow Crane Tower fire were astonished 
to discover that several shrines had remained intact. They attributed this miraculous 
survival to the spiritual efficacy of their protective deities (shenling), such as the 
carpenter god Lu Ban.
Fire was not merely a practical problem, it would seem, but also a spiritual one.32 
The alleyways of Hankou teemed with a vast array of numinous forces, including 
hungry ghosts (e’gui) and firebirds (huoniao), which could either prevent or cause 
29  Rowe, Hankow: Conflict, 164. These various techniques can be observed on display in a permanent exhibition 
‘Chengshi daohuozhe’, Shanghai Xiaofang Bowuguan, Shanghai. I am grateful to Isobel Courtney for drawing my 
attention to the British comparison.
30  Benevolent halls and temples offered numerous forms of support to fire brigades, their deities providing 
spiritual protection, their patrons offering financial support, and their buildings serving as rallying points and 
storage facilities. Shuk-wah Poon, Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou, 
1900–1937 (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011), 22–3.
31  W. Arthur Cornaby, ‘Morning Walks Around Hanyang, 3’, The East of Asia Magazine (1904): 232–7.
32  I would like to thank Desmond Sham who was generous with his time discussing various ideas in this article 
and who helped to illuminate Chinese religious ideas about fire in particular.
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disasters.33 If one wanted to survive, placating these forces was every bit as important 
as having a functioning fire service. Probably the most important incendiary spirit 
was the Fire God (huoshen). Anxiety about this potentially malevolent figure was 
so potent that some would refuse to admit people who had recently suffered a fire 
into their homes in case his influence still lingered.34 This fear inspired citizens of 
Hankou to erect a special Fire God Temple (Huoshen Miao), which was, ironically, 
consumed by flames in the late eighteenth century. Temples were large wooden 
buildings stuffed with people burning candles and incense and setting off fireworks, 
and so were amongst the most fire-prone buildings in Hankou. Nevertheless, the 
fate of the Fire God Temple proved sufficiently ignominious to dissuade locals from 
its reconstruction.35 
In addition to praying to the deities, urban citizens also employed fengshui to 
determine the geomantic causes of fire. One famous example occurred in the 
eighteenth century, when a theory arose suggesting that excessive quarrying of 
a mountain to the north of Hankou had exposed a ‘deposit of fire’ (huoku), which 
was now flowing directly into the city, causing frequent conflagrations.36 Fengshui 
seems to have fallen out of favour with the educated elite by the early twentieth 
century, as a local history written by the garrison commander Xu Huandou in 
the 1910s ridiculed those who believed that fires could be caused by the cutting 
of ‘energy pulses’ (qimai) in the landscape.37 For others, however, geomancy and 
religion continued to provide a meaningful explanation for conflagrations, even as 
new materials and markets were changing the very nature of fire.
Foreign fire
The Qing Empire lost the Second Opium War in 1860. Soon after, the British sent 
one of the era’s most notorious arsonists to open Hankou as a treaty port. Having 
burned the Summer Palace in Beijing, Lord Elgin had dealt the Qing Government 
a humiliating blow, which remains seared in popular memory in China to this 
day. On his arrival in middle Yangzi, he discovered the Wuhan cities in  ashes. 
On  this occasion, the authors of destruction were the retreating forces of the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, which had been engaged in repeated waves of invasion 
33  Cornaby, ‘Morning Walks’, 160. The Ming naturalist Li Shizhen described firebirds, bats and rats, and 
something called ‘devil phosphorescence’ (guilin). Carla Nappi, The Monkey and the Inkpot: Natural History and 
its Transformations in Early Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 74–5, doi.org/ 
10.4159/9780674054356.
34  W. Arthur Cornaby, A String of Chinese Peach-Stones (London: C. H. Kelly, 1895), 333.
35  Dating from the seventeenth century, this seems to have later morphed into the Temple of the Four Officials 
(Si Guan Dian). Liu Fudao. Tianxia diyi jie: Wuhan Hanzheng jie (Wuhan: Chongwen shu ju, 2007), 180; Ye, 
Hankou zhuzhici, 42.
36  Fan Kai, Hankou congtan (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1990 [1822]), 61.
37  Xu Huandou, Hankou xiaozhi (Wuhan: Aiguo tushu gongsi, 1915).
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and counter-invasion against the Qing forces in the city since the early 1850s.38 
It was in this vastly depleted port city that the British concession was established 
in the early 1860s, followed in 1895 by German, Russian, French and Japanese 
concessions. Having long dreamed of exploiting this legendary inland entrepôt, 
the foreigners who made their homes in these concessions were, for the first few 
decades at least, frustrated by their inability to break into the Hankou market.39 
Where foreign merchants failed, however, foreign merchandise thrived. The arrival 
of novel products would revolutionise life in Hankou, and also transform the way 
the city burned.
The first great incendiary import was kerosene. The burning of mineral oils was not 
new to China, where people had used natural deposits for at least 3,000 years.40 
Yet this new industrially produced hydrocarbon fuel, first refined from coal oil by 
the Canadian geologist Abraham Gesner in 1846, burned with less smoke and was 
several times brighter than vegetable oils used for illumination. It was improved even 
further when petroleum replaced coal as the base material over the next decade.41 
Nowadays, we tend to think of electricity as the great illumination technology of 
the modern world, yet the spectacular rise of kerosene was equally revolutionary. 
Despite some thwarted attempts to create a native oil industry, with foreign 
companies prospecting in Shaanxi for example, until 1949 almost all kerosene and 
petroleum was imported, mostly from the United States. Standard Oil enjoyed 
a virtual monopoly on the trade until the 1890s, thanks in large part to the canny 
marketing of Ye Chengzhong, a distributor who used an empire-wide network 
of Ningbo merchants. The monopoly was finally broken when rival companies 
undercut Standard by developing cheaper bulk distribution. Still, the profits that 
the corporation derived from their Chinese enterprise remained phenomenal. They 
exported 830,000 gallons of kerosene to the Qing Empire in 1874; by 1920, their 
annual exports had reached 188,800,000 gallons. Little wonder that locals described 
kerosene as ‘foreign oil’ (yangyou).42
38  James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin (London: John Murray, 1872); 
William T. Rowe, Crimson Rain: Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), 199–200.
39  Isabella Bird, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1900); Rowe, Hankow: Commerce.
40  Lianyong Feng, Yan Hu, Charles A. S. Hall and Jianliang Wang, The Chinese Oil Industry: History and 
Future (New York: Springer, 2013), 1–2, doi.org/ 10.1007/978-1-4419-9410-3; Lu  Hanchao, ‘Out of the 
Ordinary: Implications of Material Culture and Daily Life in China’, in Everyday Modernity in China, ed. Madeleine 
Yue Dong and Joshua Goldstein (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006), 30.
41  T. J. Murray, ‘Dr Abraham Gesner: The Father of the Petroleum Industry’,  Journal of the Royal Society 
of Medicine 86, no. 1 (1993): 43–4. Around the same time, James Young invented a similar kind of mineral oil 
called paraffin, the generic name still used in the United Kingdom. John Butt, James ‘Paraffin’ Young: Founder of the 
Mineral Oil Industry (Edinburgh: Scotland’s Cultural Heritage, 1983).
42  Sherman Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks: Western, Japanese, and Chinese Corporations in China, 
1880–1937 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 23, 28. Kerosene is most commonly described in 
Chinese sources as coal oil (meiyou) or sometimes lamp oil (dengyou).
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The inexorable rise of kerosene was bolstered by the near-simultaneous arrival of 
another great innovation—the friction match. Again, this product was not entirely 
novel, as 1,000 years earlier people had impregnated pinewood sticks with sulphur 
to create ‘light-bringing slaves’ (yin guang nu). 43 Despite this pioneering invention, 
flint and steel remained the dominant form of ignition until the nineteenth century, 
when the friction match, invented by the British chemist John Walker, arrived in 
the Qing Empire.44 Once again, Ye Chengzhong’s Ningbo network played a crucial 
role in disseminating this new technology, establishing a string of match factories 
in large cities. The Hankou branch opened in 1897, under the management of 
Song Weichen. By 1908, it was producing half a million boxes every day.45 The 
poet Luo Han described how this ‘foreign fire’ (yanghuo) had led Hankou residents 
to abandon the ancient practice of passing embers from one stove to another.46 
Convenience came at a heavy cost. Match factories employed women and children 
in horrifying conditions for little pay. Unlike much of the world, which converted to 
safer red phosphorus by the early twentieth century, Chinese match manufacturers 
continued to use cheaper white phosphorus, a chemical that caused poisoning and 
was liable to spontaneously combust.47 Cost-cutting helped to make merchant-
industrialists such as Ye and Song vast fortunes, whilst transforming matches into 
‘the one artefact so cheap that people might freely ask a stranger for one’, as Stephen 
Pyne has observed.48 Most people were either unaware of or unconcerned about the 
inherent abuses of the match industry, as foreign fire and foreign oil were allowing 
them to illuminate their homes better than ever before.
The price for light was fire. In last two decades of the late nineteenth century, 
kerosene became the major culprit for conflagrations in Hankou. It was not the 
first flammable product that locals had encountered. Products such as tung oil, 
raw cotton and gunpowder were known to cause dreadful infernos, yet few people 
kept large quantities of these materials in their homes.49 Strong alcohol was more 
widespread, and could cause fires, particularly when stockpiled in wine shops.50 
43  Joseph Needham, Christian Daniels and Nicholas K. Menzies, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. VI: 
Biology and Biological Technology, part 3: Agro-Industries and Forestry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 70.
44  Stephen J. Pyne, Vestal Fire: An Environmental History, Told through Fire, of Europe and Europe’s Encounter with 
the World (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1997), 48–9.
45  Ding Sheng, ‘Hanzhen jujia—Song Weichen’, Wuhan wenshi ziliao, no. 12 (2005): 7–10; Arnold Wright, 
Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China (London: Lloyd’s Greater 
Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 695.
46  Luo Han, Minchu Hankou zhuzhici jinzhu, ed. Xu Mingting (Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an chubanshe, 2001), 
67–8.
47  Dorothy Johnson Orchard, ‘Man-Power in China I’, Political Science Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1935): 561–83, 
doi.org/ 10.2307/2144002.
48  Pyne, Vestal Fire, 48.
49  For an example of a gunpowder fire, see ‘Huoyao feizai’, Dianshizhai Huabao 14, no. 88 (Shanghai, 1898). 
On the dangers of raw cotton, see ‘Bye-Laws of the Special District of Hankow, 1925’. FO 228/3187. The National 
Archives (TNA), London.
50  See, for example, ‘Pojiu miehuo’, Dianshizhai Huabao 21, no. 19 (Shanghai, 1898).
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Yet even the strongest of spirits was hardly as volatile as kerosene, which combined 
flammability with ubiquity. Worse still, kerosene was burned in lamps that were 
often faulty and, even if not, could easily be spilled. Due to this incendiary mix, 
from the 1880s kerosene features more than any other product in reports of fires 
in Hankou. Though most involved lamps being knocked over, some had more 
colourful origins. In the summer of 1890, a devout Buddhist set fire to her mosquito 
net while trying to expel lice from her bed and ended up burning her house down.51 
In another instance, two apprentices in a medicine shop knocked over a lamp while 
fighting, causing an inferno that destroyed five or six of the adjacent buildings.52 
One of the worst accidents occurred in 1887 when an impatient chef poured 
kerosene onto his cooking fire, causing a blaze that would eventually burn 2,000 
sampans and kill thousands.53 The oil fire problem was not limited to Hankou or 
even the Qing Empire. The Great Chicago Fire of 1871, an infamous disaster that 
burned $125,000 worth of property every minute for 27 hours, was rumoured to 
have been started by a cow kicking over a kerosene lamp.54 In the United Kingdom, 
the problem with kerosene—or paraffin as it is known locally—became so acute 
that parliament debated how best to regulate the fuel. The oil industry responded 
with a pamphlet entitled The Moloch of Paraffin, which sought to lay the blame on 
faulty lamps.55 Far and wide, it would seem, the revolutionary fuel that had lit the 
world, had also lit the world on fire.
The sharp increase in fires prompted the great Qing statesman Zhang Zhidong, 
then serving as governor of Guangdong and Guangxi, to offer the scathing 
denunciation of kerosene that is quoted as one of the epigrams for this article.56 
The suggestion that this foreign oil might be more dangerous than opium was 
more than a little hyperbolic—and almost certainly designed for political effect. 
Yet Zhang cited substantial evidence to corroborate his claim, including a fire in 
a Shantou paper shop, which had left 400 families homeless, and a steamship fire 
caused by an exploding lamp, which had left the Pearl River choking with corpses. 
During the winter of 1887, he claimed, not a single day had passed without a fire 
in Guangdong, 90 per cent being attributable to kerosene. Zhang had an ulterior 
motive, as he wanted to protect the native trade in illuminating oils made from 
peanuts, rapeseed and soybeans.57 He was also using America’s most lucrative export 
as leverage to reassert Qing sovereignty over trade. Drawing a comparison with the 
1881 Chinese Exclusion Act, he reasoned that if the United States was able to limit 
Chinese immigration to protect its own population, then surely the Qing Empire 
51  ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao,11 June 1890. 
52  ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 27 December 1888.
53  North China Herald, 17 November 1887, 303.
54  Rosen, The Limits of Power, 92.
55  Charles Marvin, The Moloch of Paraffin (London: R. Anderson, 1886).
56  Zhang’s memorial was co-authored with the governor of Guangzhou and reproduced in the North China 
Herald, 24 February 1888, 211.
57  On traditional lamp oils, see Needham, Science and Civilisation, 6: 8.
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had the right to limit harmful imports, concluding that ‘the law that nations have 
a right to protect their own interests and prevent injury being done their people 
applies to both countries, alike, if there is any justice’.58 Zhang never achieved the 
justice he sought, as kerosene imports and kerosene fires continued unabated.
Zhang was not the only official who sought to ban kerosene, with municipal 
governors  in Shanghai and Hankou both petitioning for similar measures.59 
Governors objected to the fuel not simply because it was a foreign competitor that 
caused accidental fires, but also because it had become a favoured weapon of arsonists. 
There was nothing novel about the misuse of fire. People had been burning down 
buildings for as long as there had been buildings. Yet novel incendiary products took 
the skill out of arson. Accelerants such as kerosene and petroleum increased the speed 
with which devastating fires could be set, while friction matches meant that it was 
no longer necessary to fumble with flint or carry a flame conspicuously through the 
streets. Even an inept novice could now light a devastating fire in an instant. This, 
perhaps, goes some way to explain why a wave of incendiarism swept through Hankou 
from the 1880s. The unstable political environment provided the motivation, yet the 
industrialisation of arson provided the means. There were several different kinds of 
arson during this period. The criminal fraternity—described in contemporary sources 
as ‘hooligans’ (liumang) and ‘brigands’ (feitu)—started fires to create chaos, so they 
could loot property and even kidnap people.60 Meanwhile, the apocalyptic religious 
groups that thrived in late nineteenth-century Hankou used arson in order to further 
their sectarian agendas.61 One such group was reported to have been behind a spate 
of incendiarism that swept through Hankou in 1898, culminating in the worst 
conflagration since the Taiping Civil War. Several square miles of residential housing 
burned, and thousands were killed, including some desperate victims who drowned 
in mud trying to escape.62 Though nobody was brought to justice in this instance, 
shortly afterwards two religious arsonists were apprehended carrying spirit money 
doused in kerosene. Whether spirit money was chosen for convenience or for its 
ritual significance is unclear. The choice of kerosene was no mystery at all, as there 
were few fuels that could burn a city better.
58  ibid.
59  The daotai of Shanghai also tried to institute a ban: Lu, ‘Out of the Ordinary’, 30. Rowe, Hankow: Conflict, 
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60  See, for example, ‘Fei ren zong huo’, Shenbao, 30 October 1890; ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 22 January 1891; 
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61  See Rowe, Hankow: Conflict. Materials gathered from anti-foreign sects were published in John Griffith, 
The Cause of the Riots in the Yangtse Valley: A ‘Complete Picture Gallery’ (Hankow: n.p., 1891). 
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A final category of arsonist comprised urban developers who used fire to evict 
unwanted tenants. One of the most infamous instances of this occurred in 1909, 
when 3,000 thatched huts burned to the ground around Back Lake (Hou Hu) in 
northern Hankou, killing at least 10 occupants. This highly impoverished area was 
no stranger to fire, having suffered at least two in the 1890s.63 In this instance, 
many suspected that the landowner Liu Xinsheng had ordered the fire to clear the 
settlement. Known as the ‘king of landlords’ (dipi dawang), Liu was one of the 
richest men in Hankou. At the time of the disaster, he was hoping to construct 
a grand new neighbourhood in the north of the city. Few seemed to doubt that he 
would use fire to hasten this process. Before long, an angry crowd had marched to 
Liu’s house, where they attempted to break down the door. In the ensuing chaos, 
a Chinese constable from the police force of the British concession was killed.64 
While Liu never admitted culpability for the fire, he did pay compensation to 
the family of this policeman, and also to those who had lost their homes in the 
fire. When hard cash failed to quell the disquiet, five persistent rumour-mongers 
were arrested and subjected to the humiliation of being displayed in wooden cages 
outside the gates of Liu’s opulent garden.65 This draconian treatment seems to have 
done the trick. When another mysterious fire tore through the Back Lake area just 
a few months later, no one pointed their finger at Liu. Fortunately, on this occasion 
there were no fatalities, yet 400 huts were destroyed, almost half of which appear to 
have been brothels.66
Having worked his way up from the squalid hide markets of Hankou, Liu was 
a hard-nosed businessman, not burdened by the scruples that had informed the 
behaviour of earlier generations of local merchants.67 In this respect, he typified 
a new breed of entrepreneurial industrialist whose uncompromising approach was 
galvanised by the fractious political and economic environment. Ultimately, Liu 
would make a far more enduring contribution to the fire safety of Hankou than his 
well-intentioned predecessors, who had sponsored fire brigades and tried in vain to 
institute moderate reforms. The spacious boulevards he built, which were lined with 
brick-built shopping malls and residential neighbourhoods, were far less flammable 
than the dense alleyways of wooden shophouses that they replaced. The centrepiece 
of his new development was Xinsheng Road, a grand boulevard that remains the 
heart of the city to this day, now renamed Jianghan Road. 
63  ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 27 October 1893; ‘Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 7 March 1894.
64  ‘Hankou’, Shenbao, 3 January1910; ‘Houhu zonghuo zishi shou si yi huo’, Shenbao, 7 January 1910; North 
China Herald, 7 January 1910, 26.
65  ‘Chengbao da nao zujie anfan’, Shenbao, 24 February 1910. These gardens are now Zhongshan Park.
66  ‘Ku zai Hankou huozai’, Shenbao, 9 September 1910.
67  Zhang Yimin, ‘Jiu Hankou de ‘Dipi Dawang’, Qi hai gou chen, April 2005; Stephen MacKinnon, Wuhan, 
1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 8–16; 
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The irony is that it seems that Liu may have purchased his modern flame-retardant 
city with fire, burning out the impoverished communities that had stood in his way. 
Though few were so directly culpable, the hands of other great reformers of this 
era were similarly blackened by fire. In 1908, the matchbox king Song Weichen 
constructed a large water tower, which not only made a significant contribution 
to public sanitation but also freed fire brigades from the arduous labour of lugging 
water from wells and rivers. While Song is fêted today for having constructed this 
great public utility, few remember how the oceans of kerosene his Ningbo network 
imported fuelled the flames that burned the city, with his matches igniting the 
spark. This selective remembrance is not peculiar to the local history of Hankou. 
It  can be traced all the way up the food chain to Standard Oil, a company that 
funded the Rockefeller Foundation to conduct medical and health campaigns in 
China, with profits derived from selling cheap kerosene and petroleum. The point 
is not to castigate particular companies or merchants for moral culpability—they 
were not individually responsible for the structural transition to an industrialised 
city. Yet  recognising the paradoxical role that dangerous technologies played in 
improving urban safety does help to complicate teleological narratives of urban 
rationalisation, especially when we realise that regions that enjoyed improving safety 
were financially linked to those that were suffering declining standards.
Incendiary politics
Of all the fires that raged in modern Hankou, none had more momentous 
consequences than that ignited on 9 October 1911. It was on this date that 
revolutionary bomb makers caused an accidental explosion in their clandestine 
base in the Russian concession. Little did these conspirators realise, as they dragged 
their unconscious comrades from the rubble, that they had ignited the spark of an 
accidental revolution that would soon bring down the once-mighty Qing Empire.68 
As government troops investigated the fire, nervous revolutionaries in Wuchang 
decided to launch the famous mutiny, the opening salvo of the Xinhai Revolution. 
Though celebrated today as a moment of national awakening, the immediate fallout 
of the Wuchang Uprising had a dreadful impact upon Hankou, as the Qing forces 
fought fire with fire, unleashing a wave of incendiary weapons on the city.69 Since 
the last time that Hankou had been destroyed by weaponised fire during the Taiping 
Civil War, durable building materials and broadened streets had made much of the 
city centre far less flammable. Unfortunately, the nature of war had also evolved, 
68  Michael Gasster, ‘The Republican Revolutionary Movement’, in The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch’ing, 
1800–1911, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), doi.org/ 
10.1017/CHOL9780521220293.010; Long Chengwu, Xinhai: Guoyun 1911 (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi 
chubanshe, 2011).
69  For a discussion of the importance of war in Chinese fire history, see Zhong Maohua, ‘Zhongguo huozai shi 
jianxi (Qin Chao-1949 nian)’, Zhongguo anquan kuexue xuebao 14, no. 5 (2004).
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as the Qing Empire had imported a range of deadly incendiary weapons.70 Hence, 
when loyalist troops advanced upon the Wuhan cities, they were able to rain down 
shells manufactured by the German company Krupp.71 One of the most spectacular 
blazes occurred when one of these shells struck the Standard Oil depot, causing an 
explosion that engulfed the surrounding area with fire and plumes of black smoke. 
Amidst the chaos of war, looters also set fires to distract the authorities.72 Soon the 
streets were festooned with the decapitated heads of arsonists, hung up by their 
queues as a gruesome warning to others.73
In histories of the Xinhai Revolution, if the burning of Hankou is mentioned at all, 
then it is usually as a backdrop to the broader narrative of war and revolution—much 
like the flames that frame the battle pictured in Figure 2. When divorced from the 
grand narrative of national politics, however, this conflagration reveals much about 
the micro-politics of life in modern Hankou. Amongst the most striking features was 
the fact that a fire that reduced the Chinese city to ashes left the foreign concessions 
virtually unscathed. Though the inferno seemed to blaze with untameable ferocity, 
it would appear, therefore, that there was an element of control.
The proximate cause of this astonishing burn pattern was the desire to maintain 
diplomatic relations, which ensured that both loyalists and revolutionaries avoided 
firing upon foreign concessions. The deeper cause was the racial apartheid that 
foreigners had imposed upon Hankou since the 1860s, which had caused a single 
city to bifurcate into two distinct fire regimes.74 The concessions boasted spacious 
streets lined with large houses constructed from brick and stone, from which all but 
a select few Chinese residents were excluded by walls and barbed wire. Though often 
glossed as Western, the style of housing in this area was an architectural hybrid, 
created as foreign blueprints were redrawn to accommodate local materials, and 
later were reworked in the hands of local craftspeople.75 By the early 1900s, treaty 
port architecture had begun to creep out of the concessions into the Chinese city, 
thanks to developers such as Liu Xinsheng.
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75  Pan Yiting and James Campbell, ‘A Study of Western Influence on Timber Supply and Carpentry in South 




Figure 2. The Revolutionary Army in Middle China, by T. Miyano. Revolutionary 
and imperial soldiers fight against the backdrop of the Hankou fire.
Source: Image reproduced with the kind permission of the Wellcome Library, London.
Though the modernisation of Chinese Hankou diminished the divides separating 
urban forms, foreigners still retained a distinct advantage. The racial apartheid 
they imposed upon the city allowed them to be far more selective in how they 
accommodated a rapidly growing urban population. Though foreign businesses 
relied upon a cheap pool of migrant labour, low-waged workers were consigned to 
live in congested alleyways outside the concession walls. These quotidian exclusions 
were amplified during the 1911 fire, when the British posted soldiers to bar the 
concession gates, sending thousands of refugees back into the heart of the inferno. 
For the British journalist Edwin Dingle, the burning of Hankou seemed indicative 
of the callous nature of a cruel race: ‘When China burns,’ he inveighed, ‘when she 
does anything that people who call themselves civilised shrink from dreaming of, 
she shows the world that she is the past mistress in all things that we call savage.’76 
Dingle does not seem to have reflected upon the savagery of his own compatriots, 
who barred escape routes to their fellow citizens in order to safeguard property. 
Instead, his sympathies were reserved for the bluejacket guards, whose ‘hearts bled 
for the pitiful people’, yet were duty-bound to prevent the menace of looting.77
76  Edwin J. Dingle, China’s Revolution: 1911–1912. A Historical and Political Record of the Civil War (Shanghai: 
Commercial Press, 1912), 81–5.
77  ibid., 85.
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Figure 3: Hanrun Lane, built in 1937, in central Hankou.
Source: Photographs by the author, 2017.
As the new republic dawned, Hankou found itself once again in ashes. On this 
occasion, the disaster was of such a magnitude that it finally catalysed meaningful 
urban renewal. In the absence of a strong central state, once again it fell to the local 
business elite. Though the 1911 fire had destroyed much of Liu Xinsheng’s earlier 
efforts, it had also provided him with a blank canvas upon which to redraw the city. 
The historians Sun Zhuqing and Tan Gangyi liken the post-revolutionary renaissance 
of Hankou to the grand rebuilding scheme in London in the wake of the 1666 fire.78 
Another comparison might be made with Chicago, reborn like a phoenix in the 
wake of its 1871 conflagration. With its bustling streets and vibrant trade, early 
twentieth-century Hankou was often described as the Chicago of the East.79 Like its 
great Western counterpart, it rose from its great fire stronger than before. Merchant 
shophouses gave way to malls, while clustered wooden neighbourhoods were replaced 
by terraced alleyways of brick and timber homes, built in the popular shikumen 
style, similar to those pictured in Figure 3.80 People still live in these alleyways today, 
78  Sun Zhuqing and Tan Gangyi, ‘Danhuo fen cheng yu neipan chongsheng—Lundun 1666 nian yu Hankou 
1911 nian de huozai jiqi chongjian bijiao yanjiu’, Xibu renju huanjing xuekan 30, no. 5 (2015): 8–15.
79  William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991). 
On comparisons between Chicago and Hankou, see Walter E. Weyl, ‘The Chicago of China’, Harper’s Monthly 
Magazine (October 1918): 716–24.
80  Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis.
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which have been regenerated and extended numerous times in the intervening years. 
They are now recognised as a form of heritage architecture—a discomfiting end for 
an urban form once considered the height of modernity. With their creative blend 
of Western and Chinese architectural elements, these neighbourhoods were not only 
attractive but also relatively safe, having been built in a style that was, as the British 
concession firefighter C. O. Nicholson put it, ‘in accordance with modern ideas … 
[and thus] of greater fire-resisting value’.81
Hankou had not solved its problem with fire. Multi-building conflagrations 
continued to occur over the next few decades, albeit less regularly than before. 
One of the major reasons was that the early republic remained plagued by political 
instability, which frequently manifested itself in fire. In 1911, Wang Zhanyuan had 
been one of the military arsonists who had burned Hankou while attempting to 
suppress the Xinhai Revolution. Within a few years, he had risen to become one 
of the leading warlords in the region. When his much-beleaguered and habitually 
underpaid troops learned that they were to be disbanded in 1921, they ran amok 
in Wuchang, burning and looting. The provincial bank and at least 40 shops were 
reduced to ashes, while the mutinous soldiers escaped by train. They did not have 
long to enjoy their spoils, as Wang diverted their carriages into a siding and riddled 
them with machine-gun fire.82 In addition to the flames of war, residents of Hankou 
were still desperately vulnerable to accidental fires. The urban renewal of the 1910s 
had had patchy results. In a sense, it had merely redrawn the fire map, making 
economic as well as ethnic distinctions key markers of vulnerability. The relatively 
wealthy residents of the city centre now enjoyed a level of protection once reserved 
for the concessions, yet detailed maps drawn by the British War Office in 1927 
reveal that large sections of Hankou were still ‘thickly populated by Chinese living 
mostly in huts’.83 The uneven nature of urban development reflected a city rebuilt by 
private interests rather under the direction of a public planning authority.
It was not until the late 1920s, when the new Nanjing Government appointed Liu 
Wendao as mayor, that Hankou would benefit from a program of scientific city 
planning. His was a technocratic administration, with a penchant for collecting 
statistical data. Though the governance periodicals this government published were 
too short-lived to provide evidence of long-term trends, they do offer an insight into 
81  ‘British Municipal Council, Hankow, Report for the Year 1925’. FO 228/3187. TNA.
82  Edward McCord, Military Force and Elite Power in the Formation of Modern China (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 49–81; Fitkin, Great River, 73–6.
83  British War Office, General Geological Map of Hankow, 1946 [1927]. Reproduced in Chris Courtney, 
The Nature of Disaster in China: The 1931 Yangzi Flood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), doi.org/ 
10.1017/9781108278362.
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the nature of fire during the late 1920s and early 1930s.84 We can see that perennial 
hazards, including heating stoves, cooking fires and altar candles, were still causing 
accidents, as were familiar modern culprits such kerosene and matches. The practice 
of bulk distribution, which importers had initiated to cut costs, meant that in addition 
to house fires, kerosene and petrol now caused explosive infernos at repositories 
and canning depots.85 By this stage, cigarettes had also become a common cause 
of fires. Though tobacco had been grown in China since the seventeenth century, 
the machine-rolled cigarettes that arrived in the late nineteenth century proved far 
more dangerous than traditional pipes, as the ash was not contained and they had 
a disposable burning tip. With 80 billion cigarettes being sold in China annually by 
the 1930s, there were 80 billion potential fires. 86 Dozens occurred in Hankou during 
this period. Electricity was another novel source of fire. With the exceptions of the 
foreign concessions, which had received a private supply of electricity somewhat 
earlier, Hankou owed its electrification to a company established by the matchstick 
king Song Weichen in 1906.87 It is difficult to determine what impact electrification 
had on fire in Hankou. While the records indicate that there were a number of 
electrical fires during this era, we cannot discern how many kerosene fires were 
avoided as a result of this new technology. What is clear is that electricity did not 
come without risks.
Novel technologies may have brought new fire risks, but they also provided new 
methods of firefighting. In the eighteenth century, shops were required to own buckets 
to throw water over fires. By the 1920s, they could purchase fire extinguishers that 
used the most up-to-date chemical methods to stop flames.88 They could also call 
on the services of a more centralised firefighting institution, as Hankou’s citywide 
fire brigade (Xiaofang Hui) had been established in 1910 to replace the older 
private brigades.89 Authority for fire prevention was not yet in government hands, 
and remained fractured, as foreigners insisted upon running their own volunteer 
brigades, bolstered by Chinese employees. Records from 1925 give some impression 
of the advances that had been made since the late Qing era. Hand-drawn fire dragons 
had been replaced by automobiles equipped with 30-metre extendable ladders, and 
rubber hoses that could be attached to the city’s new fire hydrants. The very fact that 
these motorised engines could negotiate the streets of Hankou revealed the extent 
84  Numerous articles including statistical and analytical information of fire can be found in two local governance 
periodicals. The analysis here is based on ‘Wuhan shi san yuefen huozai tongji biao’ Wuhan shi gongbao 1, no. 5 
(1929) and the ‘Huozai baogao biao’ section of Xin Hankou 1, no. 7 (1929); 2, no. 1 (1930); 2, no. 5 (1930); 2, no. 
6 (1930); 2, no. 8 (1931); 2, no. 10 (1931).
85  See the description of the Texaco fire below. There was also a fire in a Japanese oil godown in 1925: ‘British 
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86  Carol Benedict, Golden-Silk Smoke: A History of Tobacco in China, 1550–2010 (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2011), 10.
87  See section on the Hankow British Fire Brigade in ‘British Municipal Council, Hankow, Report’.
88  Rowe, Hankow: Conflict, 164; Xin Hankou 2, no. 5 (1930).
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to which urban planning had transformed the local fire regime. Though gongs were 
still beaten to raise the alarm in local communities, the concession brigade used 
a lingering whistle to alert the public. Meanwhile, citizens who wished to summon 
the fire brigade could do so by telephone. Professional firefighting techniques were 
accompanied by strict municipal by-laws, which stipulated the kinds of building 
materials that could be used, the correct manner to store inflammable materials, and 
prohibitions on flammable products such as fireworks and firecrackers.90 If Hankou 
had continued to develop as it had in the 1920s then it might have overcome its 
problem with fire. Unfortunately, over the next two decades it would suffer a number 
of blows that would inhibit its development.
The first of these occurred in 1931, when Hankou experienced a catastrophic 
flood, the likes of which it had not witnessed for a century. As water rushed into 
the streets, a number of long-banished fire hazards returned. By midsummer, 
hundreds of thousands of rural refugees had merged with the urban homeless in 
camps. These overcrowded settlements built from bamboo and thatch resembled the 
most fire-prone neighbourhoods of the nineteenth-century city. When one camp 
caught fire, a group of physicians working amongst the refugees lost everything they 
owned and had to tend to their patients without shoes. As well as resuscitating old 
risks, the flood also created new ones. Abundant water had always made Hankou 
more fire-prone, yet river water now flowed into a city filled with flammable 
chemicals, causing industrial fires in warehouses and paint shops. The  most 
spectacular occurred when a junk crashed into a Texaco oil repository, spilling 
a kerosene lamp that ignited an explosive fire. Soon, barrels of oil and petroleum 
were seen flying several metres into the air. During the 1849 conflagration, which 
was described at the outset of this article, congested wooden ships seemed to set the 
Yangzi ablaze; in 1931, burning oil and petroleum spewing out into the river set the 
surface of the water on fire.91 Though these two infernos occurred in approximately 
the same area, in the intervening years the nature of fire had changed, together with 
the material epoch of the city.
Fire from the skies
We conclude our journey through the fiery history of modern Hankou by 
examining possibly the worst conflagration in the city’s history, which also happens 
to be one of the most poorly documented. It occurred in the midst of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). In 1938, Wuhan, now unified as a single city, had 
served as the provisional capital of unoccupied China, in the period between the 
Nationalist retreat from Nanjing and the final evacuation to the wartime capital of 
90  ‘Bye-Laws of the Special District of Hankow’.
91  On fires during the 1931 flood, see Courtney, Nature of Disaster, 121–2, 138–9.
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Chongqing.92 During this period, Hankou suffered sustained aerial bombardment 
from the Japanese, as it was catapulted into the front line of the global fight against 
fascism. Yet the devastation caused by this well-known assault paled in comparison 
to that wrought by the much less publicised American bombing of Wuhan in 1944. 
By this stage, the city had passed into the hands of the collaborationist regime 
headed by Wang Jingwei. It had become an important staging post for the Japanese 
military. Having failed to make a dent in the local defences with six months of high-
altitude bombing, Major General Claire Chennault was finally given permission to 
launch a low-altitude incendiary bombing mission. On 18 December, 96 American 
Superfortress bombers dropped 511 tons of incendiaries on Hankou.93 Amidst 
the cocktail of destructive weapons deployed, this was one of the first ever uses 
of napalm, a terrifying new form of industrialised fire, made from a number of 
familiar ingredients. The base of napalm was petroleum, which was mixed with 
various powders to form a sticky gel that adhered to surfaces, including brick and 
skin. This hydrocarbon fuel, like kerosene before it, was dug from American wells 
and shipped in bulk to China. The detonator was made from white phosphorus, 
which ignites when exposed to oxygen, the same chemical reaction that is the basis 
of friction matches. It had taken the brightest minds of Harvard University to work 
out how to mix napalm in 1942, yet the actual bombs were designed by a company 
well-versed in the trade in fire—Standard Oil.94
Before long the bombers flying over Hankou could barely see the city they were 
destroying as the incendiaries they were dropping had obscured it with smoke. This 
was of little concern. The Hankou raid marked a significant shift in the approach 
the United States took to aerial warfare. Other belligerents, both Axis and Allied, 
had been employing indiscriminate area bombing since early in the war. Britain had 
created the first firestorm in the world by dropping magnesium bombs on Hamburg 
in July 1943, raising the city’s temperature to 1,500°F (816°C).95 Before Hankou, 
however, the United States had remained steadfastly committed to precision 
bombing, a  tactic designed to minimise civilian casualties. Now they decided to 
forego this moral stance, unleashing the same kind of indiscriminate incendiary 
bombing on the city that would soon devastate the urban population of Japan. 
Quite why the citizens of Wuhan, a city under foreign occupation, were granted 
92  See MacKinnon, Wuhan.
93  On the raid, see Claire Lee Chennault and Robert B. Hotz, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee 
Chennault (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949), 324–33; Hans van de Ven, China at War: Triumph and 
Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 195. Robert M. 
Neer, Napalm: An American Biography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 68, doi.org/10.4159/
harvard.9780674075450.
94  Neer, Napalm.
95  ibid., 62.
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less consideration than those living in Nazi Germany is not clear.96 There is much 
about this chapter of the war that remains mysterious, including the death toll of 
the raid, which some Chinese historians have claimed may have been as high as 
20,000. If true, then it would mean that the Wuhan raid killed almost as many 
people as the infamous allied bombing of Dresden, which is now believed to have 
been responsible for approximately 25,000 casualties.97
The amnesia that surrounds the raid is perhaps the product of the strict censorship 
in place at the time, which ensured that there is little documentary evidence. 
More likely, it is because this episode does not fit comfortably with anyone’s war 
narrative—neither Chinese, Japanese nor American. This most devastating of fires 
does, however, offer a fitting denouement for our exploration of conflagrations in 
modern Hankou, exemplifying as it does many of the processes that had helped to 
burn the city over the past century. It was ignited by a lethal mixture of industrial 
fuels and incendiary politics, as most fires had been since the mid-nineteenth century. 
It burned its way through the collective labour and capital investments of thousands 
of local citizens, who had attempted to build a fireproof city, only to discover that 
the nature of fire had evolved faster than their capacity to resist it. Finally, those 
who pumped the oil and mined the phosphorus at a distance were not aware of the 
consequences of their actions, whilst those who lit the flames seemed to forget what 
they had done almost instantaneously. This erasure ensured that later generations 
remained unaware of a shared global history of markets, materials and politics that 
had manifested itself in localised flames. Instead, they were left to ponder why an 
exotic foreign city seemed to lag so far behind the modern world when it came to 
fire safety. Meanwhile, the people of Hankou brushed off the ash and rebuilt their 
homes once again.
96  Although a compelling case could be made that this reflected some kind of racial discrimination, another 
explanation might be the change in leadership from General Albert Wedemeyer to General Curtis Le May. Neer, 
Napalm. An explanation advanced in the Chinese literature is that the raid was in revenge for the Japanese summary 
execution of three captured American airmen. Stephen MacKinnon, ‘The US Firebombing of Wuhan, Part 2’, 
in China in WW2, ed. Peter Harmsen, www.chinaww2.com/2015/09/16/the-us-firebombing-of-wuhan-part-2, 
accessed 18 February 2018.
97  Stephen R. MacKinnon has translated Chinese descriptions of the bombing but has yet to publish his own 
analysis in a peer-reviewed forum. MacKinnon, ‘The US Firebombing of Wuhan’. On the statistics of the bombing 
of Dresden, see Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 476.
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